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I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of Internet telephony or Voice over Internet Protocol
("VoIP") services has led to questions by policymakers and
legislators over the regulation of VoIP.1 In this paper, we consider
the extent to which VolP services are protected from an E.U./U.S.
perspective and the concerns arising from the current legislative
framework, mainly from a privacy perspective. This paper is divided
into three parts. Part II considers VoW services in general. Part III
examines the European framework and in particular, the current
categorization of VoIP services before considering the privacy
perspective, taking into account the Directive on Privacy and
Electronic Communications 2002/58/EC ("DPEC")2 and the general
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC ("DPD"). 3 Part IV considers the
U.S. framework in protecting the privacy of communications,
asserting that the federal courts and legislatures should act to
explicitly protect VoIP oral Internet communications. Part V will
conclude by discussing the principal areas that still need to be
addressed.
1. See David Bach & Jonathan Sallet, The Challenges of Classification:
Emerging VOIP Regulation in Europe and the United States, FIRST MONDAY, June
14, 2005, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issuel0_7/bach/ (supplying a starting
point into the classification of VoIP services). Bach and Sallet address the need for
regulation and different methods that could be used, as well as providing an
analysis of the issues surrounding the different methods of regulation available.
2. See Council Directive 2002/58, Concerning the Processing of Personal
Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002
O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC) [hereinafter DPEC] (addressing the European Parliament and
the Council of the European Union's concerns with protecting the privacy of
personal data across borders within the electronic communications sector).
3. See Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter DPD] (addressing the processing, protection, and
free movement of personal data).
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II. WHAT IS VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL?
In its broadest definition, VoIP can be described as the
"conveyance of voice, fax and related services partially or wholly
over packet-switched IP-based networks, including peer-to-peer
VoIP services and VoIP services connected to PSTN."4 According to
the latest estimate, more than 18.7 million people worldwide were
using retail VoIP services by the end of 2005. 5 This figure is
increased to nearly twenty-four million when PC-based VoIP
services such as Skype are included.6 While these figures indicate a
rising trend in the take-up of VoIP services by users, the question
arises on the main issues that dominate VoIP services and its
regulation within Europe and the United States. For the purposes of
this paper, we shall consider the narrow interpretation of VoIP to
refer to voice traffic carried over Internet Protocal ("IP") based
broadband Internet networks.
This section presents a broad overview of the technology involved
in both Internet voice and data transactions. It discusses, in a non-
technical manner, how VoIP transmits voice communications over
the Internet.
VoIP is a technology by which oral communications can be
transferred from circuit-switched networks to or over IP networks,
and vice versa.7 VoIP transforms standard oral telephone signals into
4. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
Directorate For Science, Technology and Industry Committee For Information,
Computer And Communications Policy, Working Party on Telecommunications
and Information Services Policies, Policy Considerations of VOIP, at 4 (Mar. 21,
2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/36316212.pdf.
5. Point Topic, Retail VoIP Subscribers Increase by 83% During 2005, Aug.
16, 2006, http://www.point-
topic.com/content/dslanalysis/BBAVoipana06O816.htm.
6. Id.
7. See Peter Grant, Ready for Prime Time: A New Internet-Based Phone
Technology has an Un-Catchy Acronym: VoIP, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2004, at R7
(describing the emergence of VoIP and providing an overview of the emerging
market for VoIP services). Growth projections for VoIP vary widely, but the Wall
Street Journal reported that "[b]y the end of this year [2004], about 20% of the new
phones being shipped to U.S. businesses will use VOIP technology, according to
Yankee Group, a technology consulting firm based in Boston. By 2007 that figure
should exceed 50%, and eventually almost all of the new phones shipped will use
VoIP, Yankee Group predicts." Id.
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compressed data packets that are sent over the Internet using Internet
Protocol.8 The audio signal at this point is captured in an analog
format either by way of a microphone or received from a line input
device,9 and converted to a digital representation at the audio input
device.10 The resulting digital samples are copied into a memory
buffer in blocks of frame length. Here, a silence detector decides
whether the block is silence or a portion of speech, and removes the
silent blocks to speed transmission of the digital data.' 2 Prior to
transmission over the Internet, the block itself is written to a socket.
Once this is completed, the communication is transmitted to another
VoIP terminal. This terminal parses the header information and the
block of audio is decoded applying the same codec and the samples
written into a buffer.13 Once this step is complete, the block of
samples is copied from the buffer to the audio output device.' 4 The
audio output device makes the digital to analog conversion and
outputs the signal. 5 VoIP can be used with either a telephone or a PC
as the user terminal. 6 This allows different modes of operation: PC
to PC, PC to telephone, telephone to PC and telephone to telephone
8. See generally UYLESS BLACK, VOICE OVER IP 1 (1995) (introducing the
basic terms and concepts of Internet Protocol and VolP).
9. See Jon-Olov Vant, IP Telephony: Mobility and Security 15 (May 2005)
(doctoral thesis in teleinformatics, Stockholm, Sweden) (describing the means of
capturing audio data at its source and the process by which it is transferred onto a
packet based network); see, e.g., TELECOMM. STANDARDIZATION SECTOR OF ITU
[ITU-T], INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, ITU-T RECOMMENDATION H.225.0, CALL
SIGNALLING PROTOCOLS AND MEDIA STREAM PACKETIZATION FOR PACKET BASED
MULTIMEDIA COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 67-69 (1998) (providing a technical
description of how multicast services such as interactive audio and video are
delivered via a packet based network).
10. Vant, supra note 9, at 16.
11. Id. at 16-17.
12. Id. at 17.
13. See generally, Philip Carden, Building Voice over IP, NETWORK
COMPUTING, May 8, 2000 (describing the different technologies a home or
business could use in an effort to switch over from traditional phone systems to a
VoIP phone system).
14. See generally Darrin Woods, Connecting to the Voice World, NETWORK
COMPUTING, Apr. 17, 2000 (explaining the various ways to switch from standard
PBX telephony to newer VoIP telephony).
15. Vant, supra note 9, at 20.
16. See Rachael King, Home of the Future, TELEPHONY, June 6, 2005, at 10
(predicting that consumers will begin replacing their cordless telephones with
telephone handsets capable of handling VoIP services).
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(via the Internet). All VoIP protocols are application layer
protocols. "
For some time, people have been aware of the potential for
wiretapping, but the public perceives such actions to be limited to
corporate espionage and criminal activities. ' 8 Eavesdropping over the
switched telephone network requires physical access to the telephone
line and access to some type of hardware device that may or may not
be very sophisticated. 9 Wiretapping dangers increase considerably in
the VolP world. The equipment or software needed is much more
sophisticated, but well within the reach of a sixteen-year old hacker
that has access to e-Bay or the Web. Data sniffing tools2" are readily
17. See BLACK, supra note 8, at 23-24 (explaining that the application layer is
the seventh layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Model and provides
services for end-user applications such as file transfers, e-mail, and other network
software services). The application layer is defined within the OSI Model and
utilizes TCP/IP protocols, which are an industry standard group of protocols
through which computers find, communicate, and access one another over a
transmission medium. Id. at 41-51. The protocol group is implemented in the form
of a software package known as a TCP/IP stack, which splits the transmission into
a number of discrete tasks. Id. Each layer corresponds to a different form of
communication, and the TCP/IP architecture utilizes four layers; application,
transport, Internet, and the physical layer. Id. The transmission of voice
communications over the Internet initiates with data being sent from the
application layer down the stack to physical layer, where it is then transmitted to
the receiver and ascends the stack in reverse order, ending at the application layer.
Id. at 23-24.
18. See Jay Fitzgerald, Team to Tie Net Phone Hackers; Industry Aims to Stop
Scams Before They Start, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 26, 2005, at 31 (reporting that
businesses are starting up a national organization to develop security measures
which will prevent VoIP eavesdropping before "hackers inevitably turn their
attention to the growing VoIP").
19. See K. Percy & M. Hommer, Tips From the Trenches on VoIP, NETWORK
WORLD, Jan. 27, 2003, at 48 (recognizing that eavesdropping on standard PBX
phone lines requires physical access to the phone system's hardware or phone lines
themselves). Percy and Hommer describe eavesdropping on a VoIP network as
"the most dreaded form of deviant behavior," recommending that VoIP users take
the proper precautions to prevent the behavior. Id. VoIP vendors and equipment
providers are taking the appropriate steps to prevent this behavior by adding
security features to their offerings. Id.
20. See P.J. Bruening & M. Stephen, Spyware: Technologies, Issues, and
Policy Proposals, 7 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3-5 (2004) (explaining how data sniffing
tools, such as cookie technology, spyware, and adware, pose a threat to computer
security). Data sniffing tools are used primarily to steal or transmit end-user data
from an end-users machines with or without their knowledge. Id. Advertisers can
use these tools to identify what sites end-users have visited and deliver targeted ads
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available and these tools will soon be enhanced to become aware of
the new VoIP protocols, broadening access to wiretapping tools. 21
While in an office environment VoIP traffic travels over a data
network that is used by all of the regular users of the corporate LAN
(local area network), any or all of the conversations traversing a
network could theoretically be compromised by anyone with a
regular connection on the network.22 Consequently, VolP packets
could be identified and stored for re-assembly to be played back at a
later time.23 The idea that only Internet traffic is at risk is simply
wrong.24 Privacy for oral traffic could be vastly enhanced by the use
of encryption. 5 Most corporate and home networks, however, do not
encrypt VoIP calls.26
to the end-user's computer. Id. For example, if a user visits a Florida cruise site
followed by a later visit to a golfing site, advertisers using data sniffing tools will
serve advertisements to the end-user's computer about golf course vacations in
Florida.
21. See Scumware.biz Educates About Dangers of Adware/Scumware, 5
COMPUTER SECURITY UPDATE 2 (Feb. 2004) (describing one such tool, Scumware,
that allows publishers to monitor individuals' browsing activity).
22. See Dale J. Long, The Lazy Person's Guide to Voice Telephony-Part II,
CHIPS MAGAZINE, Spring 2004, at 43-44 (recognizing that attempts to intercept
communications are likely to grow with the widespread adoption of wireless
network technologies).
23. See Arnie J. Singer, Cost-Effectiveness, Security Concerns at Heart of
Uncertainty: Debate Over Voice-Over Internet Protocol Benefits, SAN DIEGO Bus.
J., Dec. 17, 2001.
24. See Ian Shepherd, VoIP The Maturity of Internet Telephony Technology
Opens Up Network Safety Concerns Voice Over IP: Finding a Balance Between
Flexible Access and Risk of External Attack, COMPUTER WKLY, Apr. 19, 2005, at
34.
25. See Philip Bednarz, Communications Design Conference, Security
Considerations at Forefront of VoIP Design, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2002, at 63 (noting that "data encryption is the best defense against
eavesdropping"). The author, however, acknowledges that encryption and
decryption can delay packets, causing problems with two-way conversations if the
overall latency of a VoIP call is greater than approximately 250 milliseconds. Id.
26. See Yumi Nishiyama, Collective Action in a Complex Environment: The
Case Study of Network Security in Telecom/IT Convergence 3, 15-16 (Apr. 24,
2003) (unpublished Master's thesis, Georgetown University) (on file with author)
(explaining that VoIP is a solid technology; however, it requires government
regulation to ensure a certain level of product reliability and safety for the
consumer). Up until today, the users have seen security issues in the data and voice
worlds as completely separate. With the advent of VoIP, users are now exposed to
the risks of sending data over the Internet while simultaneously having the
expectation that telephone conversations are between the parties involved.
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One of the attractive features provided by VoIP is the ability to
locate intelligence at various points in the network. Gatekeeper or
call-manager type devices, which authenticate users and establish
connections,27 can physically reside on any server 8 on the network.
This is really a two-edged sword. Logging information about user
calls may be useful for billing or tracking purposes, but these logs
can also become targets for hackers. If this type of information
becomes compromised, it can create serious concerns for
organizations or individuals. 29 Unfortunately, the home user and the
majority of corporate users are unaware of any of these
vulnerabilities when they purchase or use VoIP technology.3"
Id. at 1, 8. VoIP is vulnerable because convergent technologies lead to weakness
from multiple points. Id. at 11, 34. In addition, VoIP must address the security
holes in cell phones that arise from the transport mechanisms used when mobile
phones are used. See Martius Miettinen, IT-Security in the Automobile Domain, 6
(2003), available at
http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u!mjmietti/seminaariS03/automobilesecurity.pdf.
Adjoining these problems is the reality that cell tracker tools have evolved
and people can eavesdrop with much greater ease on cellular transmission. Id.
Also, hackers can intercept data with greater ease than before when the data travels
in soft zones (unprotected) between legitimate users and cell towers. Id. Thus,
transmitting information in digital form raises new vulnerabilities and digital
devices can be used for fiscal and/or privacy violations. Id. at 17, 23. As the VoIP
systems run on vulnerable software, they must contend with all of these possible
holes.
27. See Michele Rosen, The Maturing of the Internet Telephony Market-
Market is Maturing-Internet/Web/Online Service Information, ENT, Mar. 18,
1998, at 48 (stating that a gatekeeper is an optional component of an H.323
enabled network that provides central management and control services). H.323 is
a technical standard that defines protocols which enable VoIP companies to create
interoperable Internet telephony solutions. Id. Gatekeepers usually deliver the
following in relation to VoIP services: (1) address translation; (2) bandwidth
management; and (3) routing functionality. Id.
28. See Oxford English Dictionary Online, Server (last visited Apr. 8, 2007)
("In a network, any program which manages shared access to a centralized
resource or service; an (often dedicated) device on which such a program is run.").
29. See Edwin Mier et al., VolP Security Wares; Breaking Through IP
Telephony, NETWORK WORLD, May 24, 2004, at 84-88.
30. See Fitzgerald, supra note 18 (reporting that many firms are developing
security measures to protect the growing sector of VoIP services against the next
wave of computer hackers). See generally Mike Lee, Beware! Bugs Can Attack Net
Phones; They May be Cheap But They Are Also Vulnerable to Hackers, Say
Experts, Who Advise Installing Anti-Virus Patches, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore),
Aug. 22, 2004 (explaining that VoIP phones are extremely vulnerable to hackers
because hackers need no specialized equipment to tap into Internet phones).
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III. EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR THE
PROTECTION OF VOIP SERVICES
A. NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
At a European level, the protection of VoIP services is broadly
covered under the New Regulatory Framework ("NRF") for
electronic communications, which was adopted in April 2002 and
came into effect on July 2003. The NRF was introduced after a
Commission's Communication Review back in 199931 which was
principally concerned with reforming the telecommunications sector.
The NRF is comprised of five Directives: the Framework Directive
2002/21/EC,32 Authorisation Directive 2002/20/EC,33 Access and
Interconnection Directive 2002/19/EC,34 Universal Service Directive
2002/22/EC, 35  and the Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications 2002/58/EC.36
The Framework Directive sets out the main principles and
objectives underpinning the E.U. regulatory policy on the provision
of electronic communications services and networks, including the
role of the National Regulator Authority ("NRA").37 The Access and
Interconnection Directive deals with the harmonization of the linking
of networks between operators of public communications services. 8
31. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
Towards a New Framework for Electronic Communications Infrastructure and
Associated Services: The 1999 Communications Review, COM (1999) 539 (Nov.
10, 1999).
32. Council Directive 2002/21, On a Common Regulatory Framework for
Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33 (EC)
[hereinafter Framework Directive 2002/21 ].
33. Council Directive 2002/20, On the Authorisation of Electronic
Communications Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 21 (EC).
34. Council Directive 2002/19, On Access to, and Interconnection of,
Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities, 2002 O.J. (L 108)
7 (EC) [hereinafter Access Directive 2002/19].
35. Council Directive 2002/22, On Universal Service and Users' Rights
Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. (L 108)
51 (EC) [hereinafter Universal Service Directive 2002/22].
36. DPEC, supra note 2.
37. Framework Directive 2002/21, supra note 32.
38. Access Directive 2002/19, supra note 34.
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The Universal Services Directive is important because it principally
deals with the minimum set of services to be made available to end-
users including Publicly Available Telecommunications Services
("PATS"),39 network integrity, directory enquiry services, public
payphones and special measures for disabled users.4°  The
Authorisation Directive establishes a legal framework for Member
States on general authorization4 and applies to the authorization of
all public and private electronic communications networks42 and
electronic communications services.43 By covering "all electronic
communications networks and services" whether provided publicly
or not, the Directive applies to both categories of providers so that
they can "benefit from objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and
proportionate rights, conditions and procedures."
39. See infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
40. See European Commission, Universal Service,
http://europa.eu.int/information-society/policy/ecomm/todays-framework/universa
1 service/index-en.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2006) (explaining that "universal
service" is "a safety net to ensure that a set of basic telecommunications services
would always be available at a determined quality and affordable price, even if the
market would not provide it").
41. See European Commission, Regulating Market Access,
http://europa.eu.int/information -society/policy/econmn/todays-framework/market
access/indexen.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2006).
42. Framework Directive 2002/21, supra note 32, art. 2(a) (defining an
"'electronic communications network' as "transmission systems and, where
applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources which permit the
conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic
means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit and packet-switched, including
Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent
that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio
and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type
of information conveyed...").
43. Id. art. (2)(c) (defining an "'electronic communications service'" as "a
service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the
conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks, including
telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used for
broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising editorial control over,
content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services; it
does not include information society services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive
98/34/EC, which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on
electronic communications networks...").
44. Access Directive 2002/19, supra note 34, Recital 4.
2007]
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In 2004, the Analysys Report45 commissioned by the European
Commission, was published which considered the subject of VolP
services. Amongst the issues discussed, the report examined the
regulation, structure of the telecoms market and current technology
used.46 In particular, the report authors took the view that the
following issues needed to be addressed. Namely, the current
categorization of VoIP as PATS, location independence, emergency
access, and network integrity.47 Given the scope of this paper, the
discussion will focus on the current categorization of VoIP from a
U.S. and European perspective.
B. CLASSIFICATION OF VOIP PROVIDERS
In brief, the regulation of VoIP in Europe is slightly complex 48
because there is no consensus over the categorization of VolP
services. The Commission takes a "light touch" approach to VoIP
regulation. Whether VoIP service is regulated would depend on
whether a VoIP service is considered as an electronic communication
service ("ECS") or a PATS. An ECS is defined under Article 2(c) of
the Framework Directive as a "service normally provided for
remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of
signals on electronic communications networks.1 49 Therefore, a VoIP
service that provided a product such as a software program to be run
on a personal computer with no ongoing provision of service would
fall outside the scope of the E.U. regulatory framework. 0 A PATS is
45. See European Commission, Final Report for the European Commission: IP
Voice and Associated Convergent Voices, (Jan. 28, 2004) (prepared by Analysys),
available at
http://europa.eu.int/information society/policy/econmm/doc/info-centre/studies-ext
_consult/ip.voice/401_28_ip.voice-and associated-convergent services.pdf.
46. Id. at i-iii.
47. Id. at iii.
48. See Bach & Sallet, supra note 1; Ian Walden, European Union
Communications Law, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND REGULATION 107 (Ian
Walden & John Angel eds., 2d ed. 2005); Sirge J.H. Gijrath. Voiding the
Regulation or Regulating the Void? Voice Over Internet Protocol and Voice Over
Broadband in the Netherlands, 12 COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L. REv. 150, 150-155
(2006); Katrina Dick, The Emergence and Regulation of VoIP, 10 COMPUTER &
TELECOMM. L. REv. 157, 157-59 (2004).
49. Framework Directive 2002/21, supra note 32, art. 2(c).
50. See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on the
Treatment of Voice Over Internet Protocol Under the EU Regulatory Framework §
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defined under Article 2(c) of the Universal Directive as "a service
available to the public for originating and receiving national and
international calls and access to emergency services through a
number or numbers in a national or international telephone
numbering plan. "51
The classification of a VoIP provider as PATS means that the
criteria laid down under the Universal Services Directive would
apply. 52 However, not all VoIP providers would be classified as
PATS because some providers may not give access to emergency
services as required under the definition. Therefore, the
categorization of VoIP providers as PATS is not wholly conclusive.
In response to a consultation paper on the treatment of voice over
internet protocol53 by the European Commission, the European
Internet Service Providers Association ("EuroISPA") made known
their view the need for legal certainty regarding the rights and
obligation of the VoIP service providers.54 In particular, they added
that "VoIP providers should not be classed as a PATS provider on
the basis of certain technical parameters. 55 They took the view that
"VoIP provider[s] should be categorized as a PATS provider if its
service is assessed from the demand side (i.e. the customer) as a
direct substitute for their traditional voice telephony service. '"56
Arguably, the demand for VoIP services has not reached the point
where it has replaced the traditional telephony service,57 but the lack
3 (June 14, 2004) (prepared by Information Society Directorate-General),
available at
http://europa.eu.int/information-society/policy/ecomm/doc/info-centre/commiss_s
ervdoc/406_1 14_voip_consultpaperv2_l.pdf.
51. Universal Service Directive 2002/22, supra note 35, art. 2(c).
52. Id.
53. European Commission, supra note 50.
54. See European Internet Services Providers Association [EuroISPA], DG
INFSO Information and Consultation Document: The Treatment of Voice over
Internet Protocol (VolP) under the EU Regulatory Framework: Response from
EuroISPA 2 (2004), available at
http://europa.eu.int/information -society/policy/ecomm/doc/info-.centre/public-con
sult/voip/eispa.pdf (arguing that robust implementation of the regulatory
framework will encourage innovation and new entrants into the market).
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id.
57. See Olli Mattila, Background for Discussions at ERG Meeting 17.46.04,
Voice over IP (VoIP) - Background and Regulatory Aspects, available at
http://erg.eu.int/doc/publications/consult-accountingsep/erg-0422-voip-discussi
2007] 559
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of legal certainty in this area does raise significant questions about
the extent to which VolP providers should provide access to
emergency services and the like.
In a recent decision by the Finnish Communications Regulatory
Authority,58 Ficora held that TeliaSonera VolP (Sonera Puhekaista)
service should be classified as a PATS service on the basis that it
was available to the public, users originate and receive national and
international calls, there was access to emergency services, and the
service was available through the Finnish numbering plan.59 The
TeliaSonera's VolP Service was offered only to their broadband
users and was offered as a substitute for pubic switched telephone
network ("PSTN") connection. The implication arising from the
Ficora's decision was that the TeliaSonera VoIP Service had to
comply with the obligations set for PATS laid down under the
Finnish regulations. These included making available to their users,
access to the international calls using the access code 00, availability
to users to access the emergency call number 112 and other special
emergency number free of charge, call barring service at the request
of the user free of charge, and the provision of itemized bills free of
charge to the user.6°
The United Kingdom's NRF, Ofcom has used the same criterion
as the Universal Services Directive by holding the view that a
provider qualifies as a PATS if all the following criteria are satisfied.
Namely, a provider would need to show that it was "a service
available to the public for originating and receiving national and
international calls and provided access to emergency services
through a number or numbers in a national or international telephone
numbering plan. ' 61 What this means is that a VoIP provider based in
on note.ppt (last visited Aug. 8, 2006) (predicting that the expansion of broadband
internet access is likely to accelerate the use of VolP services). In the last
presentation by Mattila on VolP market trends, it was estimated in September 2003
that there were less than 200,000 VoIP users worldwide and less than 20,000 VolP
users in Europe. Id.
58. Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority, Decision of the Finnish
Communications Regulatory Authority on Compliance with Law of the Sonera
Puhekaista Service (Oct. 29, 2003),
http://www.ficora.fi/englanti/document/SoneraPuhekaista.pdf.
59. Id. at 10.
60. Id. at 11-12.
61. Ofcom, Office of Communications, Regulation of VoIP Services 95 (2006),
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the United Kingdom, which does not meet all the criteria described
above would not be considered as PATS. 62
Whilst the criterion to qualify as PATS is clear, it is unclear what
the obligations are for VoIP providers that do not qualify for PATS
status. Certainly, such non-PATS providers, such as peer-to-peer
VoIP providers, would not have to fulfill the obligations as required
under the Universal Services Directive; however, some VoIP
providers may constitute an ECS as defined under the Framework
Directive or corresponding national legislation and therefore will be
required to comply with the obligations laid down under the NRF.63
More specifically, a provider would have to adhere to the
Authorisation Directive because it applies to ECS and the DPEC. 6
The latter protects the privacy of communications in the electronic
communications sector. The DPEC replaces the Telecommunications
Directive 97/66/EC65 by dealing with the processing of personal data
in the context of the electronic communications sector. It
complements the general DPD,66 which regulates the processing of
personal data for non-public communications, by dealing with the
regulation of personal data in the context of the electronic
communications sector. For a VoIP provider, they would, as with
any other organization or individual that collected personal
information, be required to adhere with the general DPD67 or
corresponding national legislation. The DPD was passed to
harmonize the data protection laws within the European Union68 and
available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/voipregulation/voipregulation.pdf.
62. Id.
63. Framework Directive 2002/21, supra note 32, art. 2(c) (defining electronic
communications service as "a service normally provided for remuneration which
consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic
communications networks").
64. DPEC, supra note 2.
65. Council Directive 97/66, Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and
the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector, 1997 O.J. (L 24) 1
(EC).
66. DPD, supra note 3.
67. DPEC, supra note 2.
68. For a background history into data protection laws in Europe, see LEE A.
BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC AND
LIMITS (2002); COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF
PRIVACY: POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2003); and Andrew
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imposes certain obligations on organizations or individuals ("data
controllers")69 that process personal information to comply inter alia
with the data protection principles as laid down under Article 6 of the
DPD or its corresponding national laws.
Article 6 requires that personal data must be:
(a) processed fairly and lawfully;
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes
and not further processed in a way incompatible with
those purposes. Further processing of data for historical,
statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as
incompatible provided that Member States provide
appropriate safeguards;
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purposes for which they are collected and/or further
processed;
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which
are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the
purposes for which they were collected or for which they
are further processed, are erased or rectified;
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data
subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes
for which the data were collected or for which they are
further processed. Member States shall lay down
appropriate safeguards for personal data stored for longer
periods for historical, statistical or scientific use.7"
Charlesworth, Information Privacy Law in the European Union: E Pluribus Unum
or Ex Uno Plures, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 931 (2003).
69. DPD, supra note 3, art. 2(d) (defining "data controllers" as "the natural or
legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly
with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal
data").
70. Id. art. 6.
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All the Member States of the European Union have corresponding
provisions to Article 6 of the DPD.7' Individuals whose personal
information is collected by the data controllers are entitled to a right
to know what information is held about them, including information
on the purposes of such processing and recipients or categories of
recipients of such data.72 Furthermore, data controllers are required to
"implement appropriate technical and organizational measures" to
ensure confidentiality and security with regard to the processing of
personal data. 73  For the VoIP provider, the privacy of
communications is important for users and the DPD places
obligations on anybody that collects personal information to take
technical and organizational security measures that are appropriate to
the risks presented by the processing. Subject to the exemption under
Article 23(2) of the DPD,74 any breach resulting from an unlawful
processing of personal data enables the user to receive some form of
compensation.75 As alluded to earlier, the DPD is supplemented by
the DPEC.76
C. APPLICATION OF THE DIRECTIVE ON PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS
The question that arises is what provisions under DPEC, if any,
apply to VoIP providers? First, the DPEC applies to "the processing
of personal data in connection with the provision of publicly
available electronic communications services in public
communications networks in the Community. ' 7  Therefore, private
networks are excluded within the remit of the DPEC.7 1 Although
71. See European Commission, First Report on the Implementation of the Data
Protection Directive 95/46/EC, COM (2003) 265 final (May 15, 2003), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/lawreport/reporten.htm. See
generally, Privacy in Research Ethics & Law [PRIVIREAL], Data Protection -
Countries, available at http://www.privireal.org/content/dp/countries.php.
72. DPD, supra note 3, art. 10.
73. Id. art. 17(1).
74. See id. art. 23(2) ("The controller may be exempted from this liability
[under the DPD], in whole or in part, if he proves that he is not responsible for the
event giving rise to the damage.").
75. See id. art. 23(1).
76. See DPEC, supra note 2.
77. Id. art. 3(1) (emphasis added).
78. See Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
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there have been no legal cases in Europe on this, it could be argued
that peer-to-peer VoIP service that are not provided over a public
network but through an intranet system could fall outside the scope
of the DPEC. Although the DPEC would not apply under the
example given, the general DPD would continue to apply.7 9 The
distinction, however, drawn under the DPEC between private and
public networks is unfortunate and the Article 29 Working Party t -
an advisory body set up under the DPD to inter alia examine data
protection issues, and provide opinions and make recommendations
relating to data protection matters within the European Union-has
not been slow to respond:
This is regrettable because private networks are gaining an
increasing importance in every day life and communications
of citizens, for example in the context of their work, and the
risks to privacy that such networks are raising are accordingly
increasing and becoming more specific (e.g. monitoring of
employee behaviour by means of traffic data, lack of
confidentiality of communications)."
For VoIP providers that do provide a service over a publicly
available electronic communications service, the following
provisions under DPEC would apply:
Processing of Personal Data [Data Protection Working Party], Opinion 7/2000 on
the European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection
of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector of 12 July 2000 COM (2000)
385, (Nov. 2, 2000)
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2000/wp36en.pdf.
79. See id. at 3; see also DPD, supra note 3, art. 3 (setting forth the broad scope
of the DPD which covers "the processing of personal data wholly or partly by
automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic means of
personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a
filing system").
80. See DPD, supra note 3, arts. 29, 30 (detailing the role of the Working Party
on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data).
The roles include examining questions about national measures adopted under the
DPD, giving opinions on level of protection in member state and third-party
countries, and making "recommendations on all matters relating to the protection
of persons with regard to the processing of personal data in the Community").
81. Data Protection Working Party, supra note 78, at 3.
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1. Article 5 on the Confidentiality of Communications
Member States of the European Union are required to prohibit the
"listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or
surveillance of communications and the related traffic data by
persons other than users, without the consent of the users concerned,
except when legally authorised to do so in accordance with Article
15(1) [of the DPEC]." '82 Article 15(1) of the DPEC enables Member
States to "adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the rights
and obligations provided for in Article 5,83 Article 6,84 Article 8(1), 85
(2), (3), (4), and Article 986 of this Directive when such restriction
constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure
within a democratic society to safeguard national security (i.e. State
security), defence, public security, and the prevention, investigation,
detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised
use of the electronic communication system, as referred to in Article
13(1) of [the Data Protection] Directive 95/46/EC."87
2. Article 6 on Traffic Data
Traffic data relating to subscribers and users would need to be
erased or made anonymous when it is no longer needed for
transmission of the communication.88 In the case of marketing
electronic communications services or for the provision of value
added services,89 a VoIP provider could continue to process traffic
82. DPEC, supra note 2, art. 5(1).
83. See id. (providing for the confidentiality of communications).
84. See id. art. 6(1) (stating that public communications network providers
must erase traffic data relating to subscribers and users or make the information
anonymous when no longer needed by the provider to transmit the
communication). Article 2(b) defines "traffic data" as "any data processed for the
purpose of the conveyance of a communication on an electronic communications
network or for the billing thereof ." Id. art. 2(b).
85. See id. art. 8 (covering the presentation and restriction of calling and
connected line identification of users).
86. See id. art. 9 (providing that location data may only be processed
anonymously or with the consent of the users). This is a new provision introduced
under the DPEC.
87. Id. art. 15(1) (emphasis added).
88. See id. art. 6(1).
89. See id. art. 2(g) (defining "value added service" as a "service which
requires the processing of traffic data or location data other than traffic data
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data relating to subscribers/users if the subscriber/user has consented.
The user/subscriber can withdraw his/her consent at any time.90
3. Article 4 on Technical and Organizational Measures
The providers of a publicly available ECS would need to take
"appropriate technical and organisational measures to safeguard the
security of its services."'" Examples could include measures
protecting users from viruses or denial-of-services attacks.92 Article
4(2) however, enables providers of publicly available ECS to inform
subscribers of particular risks to breaches of security of the network
"where the risk lies outside the scope of the measures to be taken by
the service provider, of any possible remedies." 93
In the context of VoP, one of the main questions to consider is the
security of communications when users connect their terminals (be it
PDAs or handheld PCs) to a public telephone network such as a
WIFI hotspot. Open networks are not secure and therefore, users
should generally use some form of encryption software (WEP for
example) to protect the privacy of their communications between
their laptop and the WIFI hotspot. However, if personal information
is being uploaded or downloaded on a user's laptop, then the
question is to what extent is a provider of the public electronic
communications required to ensure the privacy of communications of
a user's laptop when the user connects to the provider's WIFI
hotspot?94
Article 4 of the DPEC requires a provider of a publicly available
ECS to take "appropriate technical and organisational measures to
beyond what is necessary for the transmission of a communication or the billing
thereof. . ."). Examples of value added service include "route guidance, traffic
information, weather forecasts and tourist information" that could be provided to a
user or subscriber. Id. Recital 18.
90. See id. art. 6(3).
91. Id. art. 4(1).
92. See European Commission, supra note 50, § 5.5.1.
93. DPEC, supra note 2, art. 4(2).
94. See Compliance and Privacy. Wi-Fi: Are You Broadcasting Personal Data?
http://www.complianceandprivacy.com/News-Wi-Fi-broadcast-insanity.asp (last
visited Apr. 8, 2007) (noting that anyone nearby with access to the same network
could access a user's PC unless some basic security is in place, such as, a firewall,
password-controlled access, or end data encryption).
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safeguard security of its services, ' 9 5 but this provision should also be
read in the light of Article 17 of the DPD, which requires that data
controllers "implement appropriate technical and organizational
measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful
destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or
access, in particular where the processing involves the transmission
of data over a network, and against all other unlawful forms of
processing. '"96
It should also be added that a user could also be regarded as a data
controller97 within the DPD if he or she processes personal data on
his/her laptop and therefore, the privacy of communications is not
solely the responsibility of the network or VoIP provider. There are
principally two areas of concern that needs to be discussed. First,
defining the line between VoIP services provided over a broadband
network that is operated by another Internet service provider and
VoIP services where the VoIP provider has control over the
broadband network. The distinction is important because in the
former case, it could be contended that network integrity should be
maintained by the Internet service provider whilst the VoIP provider
would need to ensure the confidentiality of communications between
users over this network. In the latter example, it could easily be
identified that the VoIP provider has control over the network and
thus, can ensure the integrity of communications. Article 4(1) of
DPEC, however, clearly provides that in protecting network security,
the provider of a publicly available ECS may need to work with the
provider of the public communications network to achieve this.98
Therefore, preserving network integrity may have to be
accomplished jointly between an Internet service provider and a
VoIP provider.99
95. DPEC, supra note 2, art. 4(1).
96. DPD, supra note 3, art. 17(1).
97. See id. art. 2(d).
98. See DPEC, supra note 2, art. 4(1) (establishing that "[t]he provider of a
publicly available electronic communications service must take appropriate
technical and organisational measures to safeguard security of its services, if
necessary in conjunction with the provider of the public communications network
with respect to network security. Having regard to the state of the art and the cost
of their implementation, these measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate
to the risk presented") (emphasis added).
99. Cf In an Ofcom survey, some respondents have emphasised that no VolP
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A second area of concern that is likely to arise is the possibility of
unsolicited phone calls (often referred to as Spam over internet
telephony ("SPIT")) 00 transmitted through VoIP. Whether SPIT will
become a prevalent concern, like e-mail spam, is not entirely clear,
but in a recent consultation by the U.K. NRA, Ofcom some
respondents have taken the view that anti-SPAM/SPIT mechanisms
are being developed to deal with this type of problem. 10'
However, even though SPIT mechanisms are being developed,
arguably, the current framework under the DPEC is more directed
towards the traditional public telephone switch network. For
example, the provision on unsolicited communications under Article
13(3) requires the prior consent of subscribers in the context of
automatic calling machines, fax and electronic mail. The requirement
of prior consent does not necessarily apply to telephone marketing or
unsolicited calls to users through VoIP; the latter is covered under
Article 13(3) of the DPEC. This provision enables Member States to
determine the measures for unsolicited communications by means
other than automated calling machines, fax and e-mail. 02
service provider has control over all aspects of the network and that a VolP
provider could only reasonably be expected to deliver network integrity over the
elements that it controls. See, e.g., Internet Telephony Services Providers'
Association [ITSPA], Regulation of VoIP Services 2, 23 (2006),
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/voipregulation/responses/itspa.pdf.
100. See Ofcom, supra note 61, at 75.
101. See ITSPA, supra note 99, at 21; see also Celeste Biever, Move over Spam,
Make Way for "Spit", NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 24, 2004, available at
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn6445; Posting of Bruce Schneier to
Schneier on Security, Combating Spam,
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/05/combating-spam.html (May 13,
2005); Ben Charny, Net Phone Customers Brace for 'VoIP Spam', CNET NEWS,
Aug. 23, 2004,
http://news.com.com/Net+phone+customers+brace+for+VoIP+spam/2 100-
7352_3-5302988.html; Eyeball Networks, Eyeball AntiSPIT TM  Server,
http://www.eyeball.com/products/anti-spit-server.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2007).
102. See DPEC, supra note 2, art. 13(3) ("Member States shall take appropriate
measures to ensure that, free of charge, unsolicited communications for purposes
of direct marketing, in cases other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 [of
Art. 13], are not allowed either without the consent of the subscribers concerned or
in respect of subscribers who do not wish to receive these communications, the
choice between these options to be determined by national legislation.") (emphasis
added).
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A further point to add is that there are lists (telephone preference
systems)'03 whereby individuals can subscribe if they do not want to
be contacted by marketing companies, but presently, no lists exist in
the context of VoIP for individuals who do not want to be contacted
using VoIP. Whilst it should be noted that SPIT is still relatively
new, it is unclear how much of a risk this will be for users."
Whether there should be a blacklist against potential telemarketers in
VoIP is another question, but some VoIP providers such as Skype
and Yahoo °5 have facilities to enable users to block certain callers. It
remains to be seen whether SPIT is likely to pose a significant risk
for users.
4. Article 9 on Location Data
In the case of location data,10 6 processing of such data relating to
users or subscribers is permitted with their consent or can only be
processed when this data is made anonymous or in the case of
providing a value added service,0 7 could only be used with the
consent of the users or subscribers.0 8 This provision is probably
103. See, e.g., Telephone Preference Service, Welcome to TPS Online,
http://www.tpsonline.org.uk/tps/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2006) (describing the
"Telephone Preference Service" (TPS) which allows end-users to limit access of
their telephone and mobile numbers by registering with the Telephone Preference
Service and prevent access by organizations including charities and voluntary
organisations).
104. See Schneier, supra note 101.
105. See Yahoo! UK & Ireland, Regulation of VolP Services: Statement and
Further Consultation 6 (2006),
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/voipregulation/responses/yahoo.pdf, at
Ques. 25 (providing a Yahoo! Messenger with BT Communicator service which
enables customers to block communication from senders on their "ignore" list).
106. See DPEC, supra note 2, art. 2(c) (defining the term "location data" as "any
data processed in an electronic communications network, indicating the geographic
position of the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly available electronic
communications service . . ."). For example, a computer, mobile phone or a
personal digital assistant revealing the location of a user via such equipment would
thus qualify as "location data" under Article 2(c) of the DPEC. See also Linda
Ackerman, James Kempf & Toshio Miki, Wireless Location Privacy: Law and
Policy in the US, EU and Japan (2003), available at
http://www.isoc.org/briefings/015/index.shtml.
107. See DPEC, supra note 2, art. 2(g).
108. See id. art. 9 (stating for location data other than traffic data "[t]he service
provider must inform the users or subscribers, prior to obtaining their consent, of
the type of location data other than traffic data which will be processed, of the
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more relevant when considering PDAs, handheld PCs or even cell
phones that uses VoIP services.
5. Article 13 on Unsolicited Communications
As discussed earlier, this provision was introduced to deal with the
problem of spam. 0 9 Prior/opt-in consent of subscribers is required
when unsolicited communications are sent using automated calling
systems, e-mails and faxes."' However, in the case of existing
customers, a natural and legal person may send unsolicited
communications by e-mail on an opt-out basis.I'
6. Article 15 on Data Retention
A controversial provision, which was subsequently approved by
the European Parliament. According to the latter part of Article
15(1), "Member States may, inter alia, adopt legislative measures
providing for the retention of data for a limited period justified on the
grounds laid down in this paragraph [15(1)]. ' '1l2 This provision
should be read in the light of a recent Data Retentions Directive
2006/24/EC, l"3 which was enacted to deal with the retention of
purposes and duration of the processing and whether the data will be transmitted to
a third party for the purpose of providing the value added service").
109. See Lilian Edwards, Articles 6-7; Privacy and Electronic Communications
Directive 2002: Canning the Spam and Cutting the Cookies: Consumer Privacy
Online and EU Regulation, in THE NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR E-COMMERCE IN
EUROPE 46 (2005).
110. See DPEC, supra note 2, art. 13(1) ("The use of automated calling systems
without human intervention (automated calling machines), facsimile machines
(fax) or electronic mail for the purposes of direct marketing may only be allowed
in respect of subscribers who have given theirprior consent.") (emphasis added).
111. See id. art. 13(2) ("[W]here a natural or legal person obtains from its
customers their electronic contact details for electronic mail, in the context of the
sale of a product or a service, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, the same
natural or legal person may use these electronic contact details for direct marketing
of its own similar products or services provided that customers clearly and
distinctly are given the opportunity to object, free of charge and in an easy manner,
to such use of electronic contact details when they are collected and on the
occasion of each message in case the customer has not initially refused such use.").
112. Id. art. 15(1).
113. See Council Directive 2006/24, On the Retention of Data Generated or
Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic
Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks and Amending
Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54 (EC).
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certain data. Article 1(1) of the Data Retentions Directive expressly
provides the main objective. Namely, to
harmonise Member States' provisions concerning the
obligations of the providers of publicly available electronic
communications services or of public communications
networks with respect to the retention of certain data which
are generated or processed by them, in order to ensure that
the data are available for the purpose of the investigation,
detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by
each Member State in its national law. 114
Data is stored between a minimum of six months to two years.'
1 5
For internet telephony, Member States can postpone the application
of the retention of communications data relating to Internet
telephony until March 2009.116 The main categories of data that
could be retained are data necessary to trace and identify the source
of a communication," 17 data necessary to identify the destination of a
communication," 8 data necessary to identify the date, time and
114. Id. art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
115. See id. art. 6 ("Member States shall ensure that the categories of data
specified in Article 5 are retained for periods of not less than six months and not
more than two years from the date of the communication.").
116. See id. art. 15(3) ("Until 15 March 2009, each Member State may postpone
application of this Directive to the retention of communications data relating to
Internet Access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail. Any Member State that
intends to make use of this paragraph shall, upon adoption of this Directive, notify
the Council and the Commission to that effect by way of a declaration. The
declaration shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.")
(first emphasis added). Some Member States, however, have postponed the
application of Article 15(3) for a shorter period. For example, Austria and
Germany have postponed the application of the provision on the retention of
communications data relating to Internet access, Internet telephony and Internet e-
mail for 18 months after September, 15 2007. Id. Declaration by Austria and
Germany.
117. See id., art. 5(1)(a). In the context of internet telephony, Member States
shall ensure "the user ID and telephone number allocated to any communication
entering the public telephone network" and "the name and address of the
subscriber or registered user to whom an Internet Protocol (IP) address, user ID or
telephone number was allocated at the time of the communication" are retained. Id.
art. 5(l)(a)(2).
118. See id. art. 5(l)(b) (asserting that in the context of internet telephony,
Member States shall ensure the retention of "the user ID or telephone number of
the intended recipient(s) of an Internet telephony call" and "the name(s) and
address(es) of the subscriber(s) or registered user(s) and user ID of the intended
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duration of a communication, 9 data necessary to identify the type of
communication, 120  and data necessary to identify users'
communication equipment or what purports to be their equipment. 121
As expressly stated under Article 5(2) of the Data Retentions
Directive, 2 2 data revealing the content of the communications are not
covered. 123
Although these provisions expressly provide the need to trace the
user, the key difficulty that arises is tracing the origin of the calls that
are made. In a recent article on VolP, 124 Warren describes the main
problems with VolP from a law enforcement perspective.
The problem with VoIP, from law enforcement perspective,
is that it does not travel through an exchange. There is no
simple way to catch the packets travelling over the internet,
or even to link the 12-digit internet 'IP addresses' between
which a call travels online to any two people. Wireless
routers can generate a one-time IP address that can be
pinpointed to the wireless router, but-as in the case of a
wireless hotspot-that will show only that the call was made
from that router. 125
Indeed, the problem of tracing calls is made more difficult with the
use of wireless phones, wireless-enabled smart phones and PDAs
that could make calls from any unlocked domestic wireless access
point. The Data Retentions Directive goes some way to make it
mandatory for VolP providers to retain data relating to users, but
recipient of the communication").
119. See id. art. 5(1)(c) (indicating that in the context of internet telephony,
Member States will ensure the retention of "the date and time of the log-in and log-
off of the Internet access service, based on a certain time zone, together with the IP
address, whether dynamic or static, allocated by the Internet access service
provider to a communication, and the user ID of the subscriber or registered user"
and "the date and time of the log-in and log-off of the Internet e-mail service or
Internet telephony service, based on a certain time zone").
120. See id. art. 5(1)(d).
121. See id. art. 5(1)(e)(3).
122. Id. art. 5(2).
123. See id. Recital 13 (providing that the Directive applies to "data generated or
processed as a consequence of a communication or a communication -service and
does not relate to data that are the content of the information communicated").
124. Peter Warren, Lifting the Veil on Internet Voices, GUARDIAN (London),
July 27, 2006, at Technology 1.
125. Id.
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whether users can be sufficiently identified or with any degree of
certainty is not entirely clear.
D. CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK
To summarize, the European framework 26 should be regarded as
an important milestone for regulating and clarifying (though not
exclusively) the provision of VoIP services, yet major questions still
arise over the current classification of VoIP services, such that not all
VoIP providers would be considered PATs and therefore the
obligation to PATs providers would not apply to non-PATs VoIP
providers such as peer-to-peer VoIP providers. Thus, there is no
uniformity in the legal obligations that exist for VoIP providers. As
for the privacy of communications, this is principally covered under
the DPD and DPEC. The main areas that need to be addressed (albeit
at a European level) are the public/private network distinction drawn
under the DPEC, the preservation of network integrity between a
broadband service provider and the Internet service provider as
covered under Article 4 of the DPEC, spam over Internet telephony,
and tracing the origin of the caller.
126. At the time of writing, the European Commission is currently reviewing the
electronic communications framework with amendments anticipated to take place
starting in 2009. In the context of privacy, the main changes include an explicit
obligation under Article 4(1) of the DPEC between electronic communications
networks providers and electronic communications service providers to co-operate
in ensuring data security. The discussion of the changes are beyond the scope of
this article, but a good starting point would be the European Commission
Information Society Website, Roadmap for the Reform of the EU's Telecom Rules,
http://europa.eu.int/information-society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/roadmap/index_e
n.htm#implementation report, (last visited Mar. 15, 2007); Hogan & Hartson LLP
& Analysys, Final Report for the European Commission, Preparing the Next Steps
in Regulation of Electronic Communications: A Contribution to the Review of the
Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework (July 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/policy/ecomm/doc/info-centre/studies-ext
_consult/nextsteps/regul-ofecommjuly2006_final.pdf.
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In 1928, Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead v. United States,'28
anticipated that technological advancement would enable the
Government to employ surveillance tools extending far beyond
wiretapping. 29 In that dissenting opinion,
Justice Brandeis asserted that Fourth Amendment protections
must be interpreted broadly to safeguard against new abuses
that were not previously envisioned. Thus, Brandeis sought to
protect the individual's 'right to be let alone' without regard
to the different technologies that might be employed by the
Government to compromise that right. Justice Brandeis'
forward looking focus on individuals' underlying privacy
interests presents a more compelling perspective than the
premise of the Wiretap Act as currently applied by the
courts. '13 0
Since Katz v. United States, 3' courts have routinely forbidden
third parties from tapping or monitoring oral communications.
However, they just as routinely permit business to track, store and
sell data packets transmitted in the same way with the implied or
explicit consent of either party engaged in the transmission. The
digital age and its VoIP causes the distinction between voice and
data made in the law to become muddled in the digital age.3 2
With the convergence of oral and data into a single transmission
medium, the courts, [like computers], are unable to distinguish
between oral and data communications. The use of the VolP and
similar technologies has made this legal distinction impossible to
127. The U.S. use of VolP telecommunication technologies is maturing and
several of the issues discussed above in the European section have not been heard
by the U.S. courts.
128. 277 U.S. 438, 472-74, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
129. Id. See generally Daniel B. Game, Matthew J. Armstrong & Donald P.
Hams, Voice Over Internet Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation
Protected?, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 97 (2005) (examining Voice Over Internet
Protocol communications and whether Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Street Act of 1968 [Wiretap Act] applies to this new type of communication).
130. Garrie, Armstrong & Harris, supra note 129, at 100.
131. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the wiretapping of a public telephone
booth violated the Fourth Amendment and constituted a search and seizure).
132. Game, Armstrong & Harris, supra note 129, at 100.
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uphold because oral and electronic data communications now travel
over the same wires simultaneously, encapsulated in digital data
packets. 33
A. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS ARE PROTECTED FROM
GOVERNMENTAL PRIVACY INVASIONS
The courts have found telephone communications protected from
governmental privacy invasions in two principal ways. 134 First,
parties to a voice conversation are entitled to a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" under the Supreme Court opinion of Katz v.
United States.35 Second, the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968 prevents
unauthorized third-party interceptions of telephone communications,
unless the interceptor is in possession of a court order or either of the
involved parties in the communication have provided their
consent. 3 6 The Katz opinion explains the rationale behind the
Supreme Court's oft-quoted statement that the Fourth Amendment
"protects people, not places," '37 and concludes that an entity's
reasonable expectation of privacy must be protected from
government searches. 38 The Federal Wiretap Act was Congress'
133. Id. at 100-01.
134. See Frierson v. Goetz, 227 F. Supp. 2d 889, 896-97 (M.D. Tenn. 2002)
(describing a two-part test for determining qualified immunity). "First, courts must
decide whether the alleged constitutional or statutory violations were 'clearly
established' at the time of the alleged violations." Id. at 896. Second, the court
decides "'whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have
known that his or her actions violated clearly established rights."' Id. at 896-97
(quoting Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d 1003, 1008 (6th Cir. 1999)).
135. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that when
in a phone booth, "a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation
of privacy" and that "electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in
this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment"). The Katz
Court suggests that a man who enters a phone booth and closes the door behind
him reasonably expects that his conversation will not be overheard. Id. at 352.
136. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2004).
137. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does not
protect what a person wittingly or deliberately exposes to the public but does
protect anything a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public").
138. See id. at 353 (holding that the government's actions "violated the privacy
upon which [petitioner] justifiably relied," and thus triggered Fourth Amendment
protections). However, it is unclear how the recent action by the Bush
administration respective to wiretapping will be interpreted by the Supreme Court
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response to the Katz opinion and was an attempt to prevent
electronic surveillance of oral telephone communications without a
court order.139
The Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Katz eliminated the idea
that property rights governed a person's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 14° Katz stands for the proposition
that an individual can control which of his actions and information is
accessible by the public, 41 and what remains private and protected
by the Fourth Amendment. 142  The Katz doctrine of Fourth
Amendment protections has a twofold requirement: first, a person
must exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, that
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. 143 While the courts have read Katz narrowly in recent
years,'" and the Fourth Amendment's privacy protections only
insulate individuals from governmental privacy encroachments,145
under the context of National Security interplaying with the constitutionally
granted rights of the executive privilege.
139. See United States v. Andonian, 735 F. Supp. 1469, 1471 (C.D. Cal. 1990);
S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 38, 46-47 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112,2153,2162-63.
140. See 389 U.S. at 353 (discrediting the notion that a court must find a
"trespass," and clarifying that no physical intrusion need occur to implicate Fourth
Amendment protections).
141. See id. at 351 (holding that "[wihat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected").
142. See id. at 351-52 (alluding to the fact that while the public could see
petitioner using the telephone, Petitioner's actions in closing the door to the booth
indicated his intent to prevent the public from hearing his conversation).
143. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
144. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case For Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 852
(2004) (stating that "despite Berger and Katz, courts have proved surprisingly
reluctant to find that the occasional holes in the Wiretap Act violate the Fourth
Amendment"). Moreover, "wiretapping law may be constitutional in theory, but it
is statutory in practice . . . [w]hen wiretapping occurs inside the United States,
courts generally refuse to construe the Fourth Amendment as going beyond the
scope of the Wiretap Act." Id. at 855.
145. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613 (1989)
(stating that "[a]lthough the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or
seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative, the
Amendment protects against such intrusions if the private party acted as an
instrument or agent of the Government"); see also Schmerber v. California, 384
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the Wiretap Act is the main cause of action protecting telephone
communicants from non-governmental third-party interceptors. 4 6
Telephone communicants can obtain redress under the Wiretap Act
for unauthorized third party interceptions of telephone
communications unless the interceptor has a court order1 47 or the
consent of either party involved in the conversation. 148
While Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act (hereinafter "Wiretap Act") initially afforded
extensive protection to wire communications, oral
communications were protected only when there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Because the legislation
covered both face-to-face oral communications and
traditional point-to-point wired communications, courts were
faced with myriad interpretive difficulties. To correct the
problems with Title III, Congress amended the Wiretap Act
by passing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (ECPA). Congress designed the ECPA to prohibit the
intentional interception of oral, wire, and electronic
communications. Because Congress was concerned with
advancements in electronic technology that would be capable
of defeating any privacy expectations, the ECPA enacted a
strict set of standards for the interception of oral, wire, and
electronic communications. Congress further expanded the
protection of wireless communication by passing the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of
1994 (CALEA), which extended Title III to the radio portions
of cellular and cordless phones. In the wake of September 11,
2001, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act).
The Patriot Act contained a number of important changes to
Title III that expanded the government's ability to conduct
surveillance.
U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (stating that "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted
intrusion by the State").
146. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521.
147. See id. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (noting that a written certification from an
individual authorized under the statute also will suffice, but both the order and
certification must specify the duration, information to be gathered, and facilities to
be used).
148. See id. § 2511(2)(d).
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In the existing judicial environment, it is not clear whether
VoIP communications will receive similar judicial treatment
as oral telephone communications or whether they will be
treated as Internet based electronic communications. The
Wiretap Act's protective provisions apply equally to oral,
wire, and electronic communications. In practice, however,
courts have permitted the interception of Internet electronic
communications under the Wiretap Act more than
interceptions of oral telephone communications because (1)
corporate web portals using clickstream technology
frequently consent to the interception of end-user data for
purposes of data mining, whereas telephone users rarely
consent to third-party interceptions of telephone
conversations; (2) end-users are more likely to consent to
interceptions of Internet electronic communications in return
for increased online functionality than they are when
engaging in traditional telephone conversations; and (3)
Internet electronic communications are more likely to be
stored on an end-user's computer, making them fair game for
third-party interceptors, since the Wiretap Act only applies to
communications intercepted contemporaneously with
transmission. 149
Therefore, the U.S. framework is currently in a state of flux and is
not able to disambiguate the existing statutory language with regards
to VoIP oral communication technologies.
The issue gets even more complicated with the expansive reach of
globalization. For instance, what if a user in the United States uses a
VolP line that goes through Europe while being routed to a peer
within the United States and a third party intercepts the transmission
in Canada and is not a U.S. citizen? 5 ' The U.S. courts do not have a
149. Garrie, Armstrong & Harris, supra note 129, at 114, 120-21 (footnotes
omitted).
150. The network over which the call is transmitted can be a few feet or
thousands of miles. See Washington Exch. Carrier Ass'n v. LocalDial Corp., Final
Order Granting Motions for Summary Determination, Dkt. No. UT-031472 at 11
(Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n June 11, 2004) ("For a call from Seattle to
Spokane or from Olympia to Bellingham, this whole process of converting the call
from TDM to IP and back to TDM again occurs in the room at the Westin
Building.")
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clear answer15 and there is no clear state or federal regulatory
response. 52 Thus, the average U.S. consumer using a VoIP phone for
their conversations has little recourse against a foreign third-party
interceptor of their conversation. The consumer might be able to
assert a cause-of-action against the U.S. VoIP provider, depending of
course on the circumstances, but it is not clear whether such a suit
would be successful.
V. CONCLUSION
As identified in the paper, the regulatory framework for VoIP
services both in the European Union and the United States is
beginning to emerge. In the European Union, VolP services are
principally covered under the new regulatory framework for
electronic communications. In the context of privacy of
communications, this is dealt with under the DPD 153 and the
DPEC. 154 In the United States, VolP services are not covered by
explicit regulatory bodies to VoIP communications; however, and
unlike in Europe, the scope of privacy still remains ambiguous and
unresolved in the United States. The main areas of concern that need
to be addressed at a global level (Europe and the United States)
include the issue of spain over Internet telephony, network integrity
shared between a VolP provider and the Internet service provider,
151. See, e.g., Ben Charny, Minnesota: Phone Rules Apply to VolP, CNET
NEWS, Aug. 21, 2003, available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-
5066652.html; Ashley H. Grant, Judge: Internet Phone Regulation Could Slow
Net's Expansion, USA TODAY.COM, Oct. 17, 2003,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-10-17-netphone-ruling-
logic_x.htm; W. David Gardner, Minnesota Judge: VoIP is Unregulated Data,
TECHWEB, Oct. 8, 2003,
http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20031008 S0017.
152. See In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the
Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 28
F.C.C. 2d 267, 27, 31-38 (Mar. 18, 1971) (final decision and order); see also In
re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C. 2d 291, 39-45 (Apr. 3,
1970) (tentative decision); In the Matter of a Study of Voice over Internet Protocol,
Case No. TW-2004-0324, Order Establishing Case (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb.
3, 2004), http://www.psc.mo.gov/telecoNOIPOrder.pdf.
153. See DPD, supra note 3.
154. See DPEC, supra note 2.
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and caller identification under VoIP (such as tracing the origin of the
caller).
While the higher expectation of privacy afforded to non-Internet
oral communications by the U.S. Constitution'55 and the Wiretap
Act's prohibition of unauthorized third-party interceptions of oral
telephone and electronic communications, 156 neither the U.S. federal
courts nor legislatures have acted to explicitly protect VolP oral
Internet communications;'57 in fact, as technology is evolving with
respect to VolP and oral Internet communications it is becoming
progressively greyer and complex in both arenas.
In order to ensure that oral communications utilizing VoIP
technology will enjoy the same treatment and protection under the
law as their non-VoIP oral communication counterparts, the courts
and the legislature must act. They must either explicitly recognize
the legislative privacy distinction between digital data and other oral,
wire and electronic communications irrespective of the issue of
consent'58 or the courts must halt all use of data mining technology
155. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that
electronically listening to telephone conversations constitutes a "search and seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment") with United States v. Hambrick,
55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999) (concluding that "[c]yberspace is a
nonphysical 'place' and its very structure, a computer and telephone network that
connects millions of users, defies traditional Fourth Amendment analysis").
156. See United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that a
violation of the Act required that interception occur contemporaneously with
transmission); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) ("any person who--(a) intentionally
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or
endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral or electronic communication . . . shall be
punished .. or shall be subject to suit ... "); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79,
90 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810
(1984) ("The sanctity of the home is not to be disputed."); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353
(declaring that use of electronic eavesdropping equipment to overhear conversation
inside telephone booth intrudes on legitimate expectation of privacy); City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(describing body and home as areas "ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth
Amendment protection").
157. See Garrie, Armstrong & Harris, supra note 129.
158. See In re DoubleClick, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In
re Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1278 (C.D. Cal. 2001); In re Toys R Us, No. 00-
CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001); Chance v.
Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1160-62 (W.D. Wash. 2001). In each case,
the court held that no unlawful interception had occurred because, even if the
transmission to the third party constituted an "interception" of the user's
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and wait for Congress to deliver a legislative solution. 5 9 A
Congressional amendment would provide courts a new legal
framework in which to analyze VoIP claims brought under the
Wiretap Act, enabling them to differentiate between data
transmissions and other oral, data, and electronic transmissions.
Without Congressional action and court application, VoIP
technology remains at risk of unauthorized access and mining, which
threatens the free communication of us all. The other possible
solution, which is beginning to occur already is for each State to act
independently of the federal government; however, given the
complex legal issues, this approach is neither ideal nor likely to be
effective in remedying the situation of VoIP communications in the
United States.
communications with the Web site, it was done with the consent of the Web site,
which was a party to the communication. But see In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d
9, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that there was no consent under the Wiretap Act,
18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(d) (2004), where a corporate entity had an explicit agreement
prohibiting a third-party from collecting personal identifiable information).
159. See Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 21-22.
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